The Mallory Group

Key Findings

Results in narrative order: loyalty discount first, segmented walk-year effect second.

Lead finding: the loyalty discount

Same-team contracts show a mean overpay residual of +0.32 (n=1,115). New-team contracts show -0.45 (n=592).

The mean gap is +0.78 residual minutes per game-equivalent (same-team minus new-team).

The tier-controlled model estimates a same-team coefficient of +0.70 with p<0.0001.

Read plainly: same-team contracts deliver more time on ice per cap share than new-team signings.

The prior loyalty-tax expectation was that teams overpay to retain. This sample points the other way.

Walk-year effect, segmented

The aggregate effect is small. The all-bucket mean post-signing TOI change is +0.36.

The split by archetype is the signal. Declining veterans show large walk-year spikes over trend, then fall after signing.

Bucket n Post-signing TOI change Walk-year trend delta
ALL x ALL 1,624 +0.36 -0.15
middle x declining 142 -0.26 +3.41
top x declining 74 -0.24 +3.45
top x stable 87 -0.58 +0.62
fringe x declining 128 +0.87 +2.57
fringe x stable 43 +1.11 -1.33
fringe x insufficient_history 281 +1.86 NA

Supporting model: age coefficient is -0.17 with p<0.0001 in the TOI-change model.

Discount profile

Positive-residual contracts in the eligible set: 905.

Most common tier is middle (323, 35.7 percent). Most common trajectory is insufficient history (319, 35.2 percent).

Retention concentration is strong: same-team is 648 (71.6 percent).

Age profile is young: mean 25.01, median 24, IQR 23 to 27.

Largest material discounts are listed in the extremes section below.

What did not hold: captain-as-discount archetype

Captain contracts have a mean residual of -0.35 (n=22). Non-captain contracts are near zero at +0.00 (n=1,738).

Captain outcomes run both directions. Discounts include Mark Stone (2015, +4.28), Ryan O'Reilly (2023, +3.45), and Gabriel Landeskog (2021, +1.63).

Overpays also appear. John Tavares (2018, -4.80), Steven Stamkos (2016, -2.89), and Alex Pietrangelo (2020, -2.30).

The broader same-team discount finding is robust. The narrower captain-as-discount archetype does not generalize in this thin sample.

Bergeron is a narrative anchor, not a panel row. His defining 2013 deal predates the contract source window in this pull.

Material overpays and discounts

Material lens floors: cap share at least 0.03, and usage at least 82 games or at least 1,000 TOI minutes.

Largest overpays

Player Signing year Previous team New team Residual
Brendan Smith2017*DETNYR-6.13
Marc-Edouard Vlasic2017*SJSSJS-6.08
Dmitry Orlov2023WSHCAR-5.84
Corey Perry2013*ANAANA-5.82
Dougie Hamilton2021*CARNJD-5.28
Erik Karlsson2019*SJSSJS-5.25
Jeff Skinner2019*BUFBUF-4.90
Evgeni Malkin2013*PITPIT-4.85
John Tavares2018*NYITOR-4.80
Nicklas Backstrom2020*WSHWSH-4.72

Largest discounts

Player Signing year Previous team New team Residual
TJ Brodie2013CGYCGY+6.63
Valeri Nichushkin2020*COLCOL+5.11
Neal Pionk2019*NYRWPG+4.97
Darnell Nurse2018EDMEDM+4.87
Robert Thomas2021STLSTL+4.82
Devon Toews2020*NYICOL+4.80
Chandler Stephenson2020*WSHVGK+4.76
Cody Ceci2016OTTOTT+4.70
Sam Reinhart2018BUFBUF+4.56
Roman Josi2013NSHNSH+4.45

What the residual measures

The residual is how many minutes per game a player delivered versus what the model expected for their cap share and position. It measures value per dollar, not quality.

Erik Karlsson at -5.25 is a useful example. His 2019 deal was 14 percent of the cap. The model expected about 29.5 minutes per game. He delivered about 24.2 minutes per game across observed seasons. The five-minute gap is the residual.

By quality he was elite. He won the 2022-23 Norris during this contract. But the cap share implied a usage tier his actual minutes did not fully match. The residual is honest about that, without making any claim on his quality.

Some of these contracts are still active. Their residuals reflect observed seasons only and may shift as the remaining seasons play out. Numbers are current as of the latest site update. Rows marked with * indicate active contracts.